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ABSTRACT  
The literature on environmental policy shows that institutional arrangements are key in designing 
effective environmental policies. Besides regulation and market (Coasian) solutions, grass root 
collective action has been advocated as a possible solution for the provision of agro-environmental 
public goods. We gauge that the same institutional arrangement can be found in many territorially 
integrated food chains that aims at re-embedding food production in the local society. Building on 
this literature, we present a case study - a short supply chain for bread production from ancient local 
wheat landraces in Tuscany – emphasizing the role played by collective action in maintaining high 
quality production in a context of severe information asymmetries. 
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1. Introduction 
The adoption of high yield variety (HYV) wheat has substantially contributed to fight hunger and 
poverty all over the world.
1
 However increased crop productivity did not come for free: there were 
both ecological and nutritional costs.  
Indeed modern agricultural practices usually imply a higher ecological footprint in the form of 
higher input requirements (primarily, water and energy such as fertilizers and pesticides), soil 
degradation, and loss of genetic diversity. In particular, the widespread use of HYVs marginalised older 
and local varieties that have had a key role in maintaining a broader genetic base for the breeding 
activities. This represents one of the major threats to the sustainability of agriculture since traditional 
varieties are more suitable to cope with increasing environmental variability due to climate change  
(Heisey  PHeisey P. and Rubenstein K., 2015) and rising cost of fuel based inputs since they have been 
developed along with diversified environmental conditions and require lower inputs (Wolfe et al. 
2008). 
Furthermore, the adoption of HYV wheat brought about also nutritional concerns (Sofi et al., 
2013). Apparently, seeking for higher yields as well as better technological performances of flour and 
semolina as required by downstream processing industry led to oversee other biochemical 
                                                          
1
 This is true both in the developed world where the introduction of HYVs increased agricultural 
productivity  and in the Third World where the so called green revolution contributed to poverty 
reduction either through increased sector productivity or lower food prices (Pingali, 2012) 
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characteristics related to digestibility and gluten tolerance that were instead well represented in older 
cultivars bred till the first half of the 19
th
 century.  
As a result, there is a renewed interest towards ancient wheat varieties as a genetic pool that can 
prove useful both to adapt to climate change (Heisey and Rubenstein, 2015) and to develop functional 
foods (Cooper, 2015). Italy is not an exception and there are many examples of rediscovery of 
landraces or ancient wheat varieties. Most of the cases are linked to territorially integrated short food 
supply chains involving different actors from farmers to consumers who join their efforts to achieve a 
common goal, that is setting up sustainable wheat chains which conjugate environmental 
preservation, social inclusion and consumer health (Reti Semi Rurali, 2015). At first glance, this 
institutional arrangement seems to have a comparative advantage vis-à-vis other organizational 
arrangements in terms of overcoming the higher transaction cost involved in producing and marketing 
highly differentiated products. 
Therefore, our aim is to present some preliminary results from a case study of one of the above 
mentioned local food chains for the bread production and conservation of agro-biodiversity, using as 
analytical framework the one proposed by Ostrom (2007, 2009) and Ayer (2007). The paper is 
organized as follows: section 2 provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of the case study, 
section 3 summarizes the most important methodological aspects, while section 4 reports the main 
results of the application to the case study. Some concluding remarks are provided in the last section. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Cultivation and transformation of ancient wheat in valuable products is quite a different 
enterprise with respect to what we observe in conventional pasta and bread chains. As it is common in 
other cases of sustainable agriculture and sustainable food chain, technologies and practices need to 
be adapted to local conditions and to heterogeneous raw materials.  This requires coordinating efforts 
by farmers, millers and bread or pasta makers as well as the consumers willingness to recognise the 
non conventional quality of ancient wheat.  Not surprisingly, human and social capital development is 
considered a prerequisite for successful sustainable agricultural initiatives (Pretty, 2005, p. 3). 
Maintaining high quality levels along a food chain entails a number of activities such as 
information searching, drafting of agreements, monitoring of agreements; all those elements are 
typically classified as transaction costs. The level of transaction costs depends on some transaction 
dimensions identified by Williamson (1996) as the kind and the level of uncertainty, asset specificity 
conditions and frequency of transactions. Among these three elements the specificity of the assets is 
quite relevant in our context. It occurs when a transaction requires a specialized investment that 
cannot be reused in an alternative activity without a loss of value (depreciation). The investment in 
specific resources generates a binary dependence due to the incomplete nature of contracts and to 
the opportunistic behaviour of agents (Klein et al., 1978).
2
 Given the peculiarity of differentiated, non-
conventional products the issue of the asset specificity arises in the wheat chain. Among the most 
frequent forms of asset specificities two are salient in the case of high quality food:  
- specificity of human resources, whose development arises in “learning by doing” during the 
transaction process ;  
- specificity of capital linked to the brand value that emerges whenever the brand reputation 
can be damaged by the counterpart behaviour (Stefani and Sutera, 2001).  
Transaction costs are an issue also in the management of common resources. We can consider 
different systems of coordination mechanisms in this respect (Vatn, 2005). The markets are the most 
common coordinating mechanisms usually requiring well-defined property rights allocated to 
                                                          
2
 Indeed, the specific assets would become useless once the contractual relationships is broken by the 
counterpart 
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individuals (private property). Markets rely on short lived and anonymous relations. Pervasive 
externalities as well as high transaction costs hamper the markets efficiency. Bureaucracies are 
another coordinating mechanism which may not perform well. At least in the case of resource 
management, formalized external rules enforced by state officials often lack legitimacy among local 
communities governed by internal rules or norms. In the case of food chains how official certification 
schemes enforced by the state perform in comparison with management schemes autonomously 
developed by chain actors is an empirical question. Finally, communities are a form of coordination 
systems based on personal and durable relations, which allow agents to overcome through trust and 
reciprocity most of the transaction costs (Dasgupta, 2007).  
Communities are often associate with common property rights regimes over resources. In the 
case of food chain, transaction costs often are lower within specific communities with high degree of 
social cohesion and reciprocity. The diffusion of short food supply chain is an example of how informal 
relationship may assure quality even in the absence of official certification schemes (Renting et al., 
2003). 
 Problems of coordination and cooperation have been widely investigated with respect to the use 
of natural resources comparing commons with other property regimes (Vatn, 2005; Ostrom, 2012). 
They all refer to the basic question “How do fallible humans come together, create communities and 
organizations, and make decisions and rules in order to sustain a resource or achieve a desired 
outcome?” (Ostrom and Hess, 2007). Research on the issue has been carried out either within a game 
theory framework (Ostrom, 2007) or looking at aspects of social cohesion, reciprocity and 
communication (Vatn, 2005). 
 
 
  Source: Ostrom (2009) 
 
Figure 1.  Ostrom’s framework (socio-ecological system) 
 
Ostrom (2009) provides a multilevel nested framework to analyse the outcomes (in terms of both 
ecological and social performances) obtained in the so-called socio-ecological systems. The scheme, a 
development of his previous Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, is articulated in 
four core subsystems (Figure 1): resource systems (such as fisheries, pastures or woodlands), resource 
units (such as fishes or trees), governance system (including the property rights regimes) and the users 
or actors involved. The subsystems affect each other and in turn all affects the situation where 
individuals and group interact determining the outcomes in terms of ecological and social 
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performances. Beyond this first tier of variables, other tiers have been proposed detailing each 
subsystem (Table 1).
3
  
 
Table 1. Second tier variables of a socio ecological system 
 
Source (Ostrom, 2010) 
 
However translating the findings of the studies on natural resource management to a food supply 
chains is not straightforward and some caveats are needed.  
The place that the natural resources such as fisheries or woodlands hold in Ostrom’s framework 
could be attributed to the maintenance of the quality value along the chain. In a sense maintaining 
quality as a common intangible value (good) along the chain requires coordination and cooperation by 
all involved actors and the quality characteristics influence in turn the type of coordination required. 
Similarly the role of resource units that in Ostrom’s framework is covered by items such as fishes or 
trees, may be attributed to the typical object of appropriation in a food chain, that is the added value 
generated on the market by the (vertical) differentiation of the good (Lancaster, 1971; Mussa and 
                                                          
3
 This framework, with minor modifications has been used in a range of agri-food setting all involving 
some sort of cooperation or coordination between a group of actors and different types of common 
resources (OECD, 2013; Quiñones-Ruiz, 2016). 
RS1 GS1
RS2 GS2
RS3 GS3
RS4 GS4
RS5 GS5
RS6 GS6
RS7 GS7
RS8 GS8
RS9
RU1 U1 Number of users*
RU2 U2 Socioeconomic attributes of users
RU3 U3 History of use
RU4 U4 Location
RU5 U5 Leadership/entrepreunership*
RU6 U6 Norms/social capital*
RU7 U7 Knowledge of SES/mental models*
U8 Importance of resource*
U9 Technology used
I1 O1
I2
I3
I4 O2
I5
I6
I7 O3 Externalities to other SESs
I8
* Subset of variables found to be associated with self-organisation
S1  Economic develompent. S2  Demographic trends. S3  Political stability.                                        
S4 Government resource policies. S5  Market incentives. S6 Media organization
Social, economic and political setting (S)
Resource systems (RS)
Monitoring and sanctioning processes
Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish)
Clarity of system boundaries
Size of resource system*
Human-constructed facilities
Productivity of system* Operational rules
Collective-choice rules*
Constitutional rules
Resource units (RU)
Resource unit mobility*
Equilibrium properties
Predictability of system dynamics*
Storage characteristics
Location
Governance system (GS)
Government organisations
Nongovernment organisations
Network structure
Property-rights systems
Social performance measures (e.g., 
efficiency, equity, accountability, 
sustainability)
Ecological performance measures (e.g., 
overharvested, resilience, bio-diversity, 
sustainability
Users
Interactions (I) ?  Outcomes (O)
Harvesting levels of diverse users
Information sharing among users
Deliberation processes
Distinctive markings
Spatial and temporal distribution
Growth or replacement rate
Interaction among resource units
Economic value
Number of units
Related ecosystems (ECO)
ECO1  Climate patterns. ECO2  Pollution patterns. ECO3  Flows into and out local SESs
Conflicts among users
Investment activities
Lobbying activities
Self-organizing activities
Networking activities
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Rosen, 1978). Opportunistic behaviour may destroy the value added in the same way as natural 
resources may be destroyed by “apparently rational actions of people” (Pretty, 2003). Conversely, 
Ostrom’s governance and users subsystems are more general in scope and can be applied to the food 
chain case with only minor changes. 
3. Methods 
The paper is based on a case study of a bread supply chain from wheat landraces which has 
developed in Tuscany over the past decade. Being exploratory in nature, our study relies on a set of 
qualitative research methods such as semi-structured interviews, group interviews and analysis of 
secondary data. 
We interviewed current key actors of the chain or people involved in the start up of the initiative. 
An interview protocol was prepared; however, as it is common practice, flexibility was encouraged to 
better grasp what the interviewees see as relevant. We also took field notes of experiences, public 
meetings and other social activities related to the chain in which we participated. In a sense our 
approach stand in between two well-known rural development appraisal methods: rapid rural 
appraisal and participatory rural appraisal (Chambers, 1994), both employed to study the collective 
management of natural resources; (Vanni, 2014). Indeed, in parallel with the present research we also 
carried out, with the same actors, a participatory scenario building exercise addressing and sharing the 
concern of the actors with respect to opportunities and threats that their chain is going to face in the 
near future. Combining participatory and non-participatory methods allows researchers to gain better 
access to the organizations in which they conduct research (Bryman, 2001). 
Semi-structured interview and group interviews
4
 were transcribed, coded and analysed with 
reference to the Ostrom’s framework. 
4. Results 
The implementation of a bread short supply chain from ancient wheat landraces in Montespertoli 
(Tuscany) provides a paradigmatic case study of an innovative grass-root institutional set-up providing 
environmental and social benefits through a sustainable food chain (agriculture) (Gualandi and 
Gualandi, 2016). 
Montespertoli is a rural settlement located some 30 kilometres from Florence that in the 50s was 
considered the granary of Florence . Its bread-making tradition was very well known all over central 
Tuscany. However, during the 60s its importance started to decline with the migration from 
agriculture towards non-agricultural sectors and from rural areas towards urban areas. In the 
subsequent decades Wine ( Chianti)
5
and olive oil remained the predominant agricultural produce of 
the area. Farm diversification (especially agritourism) contributed to the economic sustainability of the 
remaining farms maintaining the rural nature of the area (Gualandi and Gualandi, 2016). In 2004 a 
group of farmers, a miller and few bakers decided to gather to revive the local old bread making 
tradition exploiting the opportunity offered by the Regional Rural Development Plan initiative devoted 
to short food supply chains. However, this fist attempt did not succeed
6
 because the involved actors 
were producing bread featuring characteristics not sufficiently differentiated from those of competing 
industrial breads.  
                                                          
4
 Overall we carried out 3 group interviews and 3 single interviews 
5
 In 1996 the denomination Chianti Montespertoli was instituted as a separate sub area of the Chianti 
area to which Montespertoli has always belonged. 
6
 The quantity of flour used to produced bread remained well below 100 q/year. 
Lombardi et al. / Proceedings in System Dynamics and Innovation in Food Networks 2017, 404-417 
409 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18461/pfsd.2017.1741 
In 2008 the local miller and a baker decided to differentiate the bread they produced using 
ancient wheat landraces that had made the Montespertoli bread well known in Florence and 
surrounding areas until mid XX century. With the help of the University of Florence they managed to 
involve few farmers in cropping ancient varieties and another baker. Lost traditional production 
techniques at every level of the chain (cropping, milling and baking) were reintroduced, assuring the 
conservation of local agro-biodiversity and soil fertility as well as the production of healthy, high 
quality bread.  
Today, the Montespertoli ancient wheat supply chain is a success story . Over 450 hectares are 
involved in the chain, more than 800 quintals of ancient grain are milled by the local miller and 600 
quintals of bread baked by the two bakers of the chains. Quantities have been slowing rising since the 
inception of the initiative and soared in recent years ( Gualandi and Gualandi , 2016) 
4.1. Resource characteristics 
The maintenance of the quality value along the bread chain and the building of reputational 
capital associated to bread making is the intangible objective of the collective effort observed in 
Montespertoli. The production of bread from wheat's ancient varieties benefitted from coordinating 
and connecting all actors of the production chain from farmers to consumers including researchers 
from the University of Florence.  Ancient varieties of wheat as well as landraces require appropriate 
cultivation techniques. They were bred in the 20s of the XX century when few if any chemical and 
mechanical inputs were available. These varieties are taller than modern varieties, more prone to 
fungal infections, more variable in both genotype and phenotype and quite less productive, at least 
from a merely quantitative point of view (Benedettelli et al. 2013). As such, they can be considered a 
rather different crop from conventional, modern wheat, akin to an innovative minor crop. As other 
innovative minor crops ancient wheat varieties suffer from lack of codified technical knowledge, 
absence of market data, and uncertain economic perspectives. 
Lack of codified knowledge about production method and product characteristics is shared by the 
subsequent food chain actors: miller, baker, pasta maker and even consumers. To preserve all its 
nutritional characteristics wheat must be stone ground, a practice almost abandoned by the 
Montespertoli miller but still present in his memories since he belongs to a miller’s family active since 
the XVIII century. Next, bread has to be made with sourdough and requires specific technique and 
longer rising times due to the peculiar technological properties of the flour. Summing up producing 
high quality bread from ancient wheat requires a set of complicated and interconnected tasks to be 
performed in the best way by different actors, it requires a good deal of coordination and a deep 
collaboration. Eventually consumers need to reintroduce in their diet a long-forgotten food, quite 
different in sensory characteristics from their conventional counterparts (Rocchi et al., 2001) as stated 
by a farmer: 
 
“Indeed, when I downloaded the first cart at the mill, the ancient grains, when it opens 
the cart you may feel the grain that falls down and scent. I say: 'Look, this perfume reminds 
me of when I was a child, when my grandfather was threshing the wheat’, that is we felt 
that smell, that aroma. Instead with the modern grains you do not smell anything. So, if you 
smell the commercial bread, the one all bakers do, you smell an aroma, more or less 
pleasant, more or less intense, if you smell the bread made with ancient grains [you find ] 
again that smell that I felt when I downloaded the cart” [group interview 2] 
 
Two of the key aspects of the resource system according to the IAD framework are the size of the 
system and the evidence of its boundaries. However, the ancient wheat cultivated area (about 120 ha) 
or the quantity of milled wheat (about 800q in 2015) is a rather crude measure of the size of the 
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system. In the Montespertoli case what adds value to the locally produced bread is mostly the 
nutritional characteristics of the product obtained thanks to a successful management of quality 
aspects along the chain. The relevant points are: the characteristic of the interaction between the 
germoplasm of the wheat varieties and environment as well as the quality management of the chain. 
Whereas there is no reason to believe that the wheat produced by farmers in Montespertoli is 
different from the one that can be produced elsewhere using the same varieties, the social structure 
that underpins the observed management of the quality is location-specific: no more than 30 actors 
(see section 4.3), most of them residing in the village, are involved. Indeed, we observe in 
Montespertoli a form of deepening of social relationships that have been described in the community 
vs. market  literature (Dasgupta, 2007). Hence, this appears to be a case in which resource boundaries 
are less clearly defined whereas boundaries of the user group is quite clear (Cox et al., 2010). In fact, in 
the Montespertoli experience, the boundary seems to rely in the local community’s dimension, as 
perceived by the actors themselves. The production systems is first aimed at delivering the intangible 
and tangible values (local traditional heritage, nutritional value, landscape and environment 
preservation, local identity) of the bread to the people living in the Montespertoli area, only the 
production surplus is sold in small selected groceries located in Florence. 
4.2. Resource units 
The role of resource units in our case study may be attributed to the added value generated by 
the chain. This is what is appropriable by chain actors and what is relevant for distributive issues. 
Undoubtfully, the value of the bread originates from the demand side. Consumers appreciate tangible 
and intangible values of the produce, dealing with the nutritional qualities of the bread and possibly 
also with the social and environmental sustainability of the chain. These are well known by local 
consumers in Montespertoli because of proximity, of the school canteen procurement policy and of 
the communication campaigns done in schools, in sales points and during local festivals and events. As 
stated by a baker : 
  
“when we make bread with the pupils we bring with us the grain spikes, we make 
them glean the grains, then  we mill the grain, they see the flour[…] we make a piece of 
bread together, we bake it and eventually they take it: I see things changing since when 
they are back home they tell it to their parents” [group interview n.1] 
 
Currently Montespertoli bread from ancient wheat is sold at a price 55% higher than that of the 
conventional bread. A considerable premium price, which is evenly distributed between chain actors 
(Table 2). Noticeably the presence of shared economic benefits is one of the determinants of success 
of grass root collective action (Ayer, 1997). 
 
Table 2. Premium over price of conventional bread 
Product 
1 
Conv. 
coeff. 
 
2 
Product 
premium 
€/q 
3 
Bread equiv. 
premium 
€/q 
4 
% of Bread 
premium 
 
     
Bread 1 145 145 100% 
Flour 0.83 111 92 64% 
Wheat 1.11 36 40 27% 
      
Note: column 2 is the premium over the price of conventional product 
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As other niche markets also the Montespertoli chain can maintain its properties only if 
adequately protected from external competition (Wiskerke, 2003). Lack of such protection would 
quickly result in the shrinking of the price premium for the chain actors. Thus, stability and durability 
of benefits in face of external competition are two other key variables to consider for this type of 
resource unit subsystem
7
.  
4.3. Actors 
The Montespertoli bread chain is based on a relatively small number of actors. If we exclude local 
consumers there are no more than 30 actors, among which we find 20 farmers, one miller, two bakers, 
two pastry makers, one pasta maker, the local municipality and an agronomist. Although small, the 
group is heterogeneous because different businesses are involved and a few of them do not belong to 
the community of people living in Montespertoli. Furthermore, even among farmers there are 
differences, some of them being full-time other being part-time farmers, some of them being certified 
organic while others are not, etc.  
The size of the group is one of the determinants of the success of a collective action: the smaller 
the group the better the ability of dealing with possible free riders (Ostrom, 2007). The actors are well 
aware about the importance of maintaining a small scale for the initiative as the miller states: 
 
“It works at technical level since we are small, since we provide a guarantee, since, 
despite all the pressure, we decided to not grow” [group interview n.1] 
 
Heterogeneity of participants may hamper cooperation due to higher transaction costs and 
possible conflicts arising over the distribution of costs and benefits (Ostrom 2007). However, rules may 
be devised to assure that those who benefit more also bear higher costs (Ayer, 1997). Production scale 
(size heterogeneity) is perceived as a problem as one of the farmers states: 
 
Indeed the chap who had 500 hectars has been stopped at once [from joining the 
chain]. We stopped because otherwise we would have become dependent from him. Do 
you understand?”[group interview n. 2] 
 
Conversely, heterogeneity of business may be a necessity because only with a certain degree of 
division of labour (farming, milling, baking) the high level of quality may be assured. As a farmer states: 
 
“The mill is the key, because without a good mill we can do nothing” [group interview 
1] 
 
The degree of division of labour is a specific feature of the chain which imply heterogeneity of the 
actors. Other governance structures are possible. For example farming , milling and bread making 
activities may be gathered within a single firm (vertical integration). However, if tacit knowledge for a 
single activity is highly specific and a certain degree of division of labour is advisable, then transaction 
costs should be controlled by appropriate governance structures as it is illustrated in the next section 
The leadership of the bread chain has been jointly exerted by the miller and one of the bakers at 
least in the start-up phase. We must acknowledge also the role of a researcher from the University of 
                                                          
7
 To some extent these two variables are akin to the property of resource mobility, one of the 
determinants of collective action in the Ostrom framework ( see table 1). Whereas in the natural 
resource case we refer to the mobility of fish stocks in open sea fisheries or game in a woodland, here it 
is the possibility to maintain the added value within the local system which is important. 
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Florence, which provided the initial inspiration and technological knowledge necessary to switch to the 
ancient wheat varieties (Gualandi and Gualandi, 2016). Similarly a key role is played by an agronomist 
which has provided technical assistance to the farmers since the start of the initiative. 
 Finally, the case study provides an example of a group, which share strong values and a good 
degree of social capital, which is typical of Central Italy villages (Putnam, 1993). The group clearly 
identify themselves as a collective subject, a “we” as was put forward by one of the members: 
 
“It is not a question of following the technical specifications, if you are not one of us it 
is different. If one of us has got a problem our technical specifications are sufficiently 
flexible to manage the problem. It is not about what you are doing, it is that you are not one 
of us, we must be identifiable as us, we have always put our face on it” [interview n. 2] 
 
The collective subject, as the local actors perceive it, consists in the sense of belonging to a 
shared social, cultural and physical heritage viewed as a common value to be restored, preserved and 
enhanced. In the believing that the standardisation of life styles and consumption is no longer the 
answer to the problems that our society has to face.  
4.4 Governance system and Interactions 
The Montespertoli bread chain was initially informally managed. To some extent, a social 
network was already in place with a central node identifiable with the figure of the miller to whom 
farmers brought the grain to be milled and bakers bought the flour for their bakeries. The village scale 
of the chain and the recurrence of transactions assured that every actor knows each other personally. 
In some cases, the relationship was even of friendship. Current transaction arrangements between 
farmers and miller and between miller and bakers are still informal and verbal. 
 
"Ancient grains of Montespertoli should remain within Montespertoli and neighboring 
municipalities since in this way we know each other, we know how we behave and word of 
mouth is simple and quick, while if you go to Milan you no longer know what happens” 
[single interview n. 2] 
 
In 2013 a no profit association was created: the Ancient Grains of Montespertoli Association. The 
Association has the objective “to protect and help producers comply with the association guidelines 
and promote ancient grain products” (Gualandi and Gualandi, 2016). It also has a political role acting 
as a stakeholder between the chain and local government levels (mainly the Montespertoli 
municipality). Issuing specific technical guidelines for cultivation, milling, bread making and pasta 
making, the association regulates the behaviours of chain actors to maintain a high level of quality 
along the chain. This is the set of rules, which governs the common values/resource. 
In addition also the distribution of the added value generated by the chain is negotiated within 
the association, which “makes sure that higher prices paid by consumers are transferred to the 
farmers” (Gualandi and Gualandi, 2016). Indeed the Association board decided to fix the price of 
wheat at a level able to assuring that most of the costs incurred by farmers were covered. This 
represents non only a mechanism ensuring to cover the production costs, but also a mechanism of 
reducing price volatility. In other words, the mechanism devised by the Association can be thought as 
an interlinked contract (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986) where the two parties (farmer and miller) 
transact not only on the commodity market (selling/buying the grains) but they also trade on the 
insurance market through a risk sharing arrangement that allows to switch part of the risk to the 
miller.  
As a farmer stated: 
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The nice thing has been to gather all together thanks to Gianni and Marco [the miller 
and a baker], they have led everything, […] if they did not start to say “let us make it, seat 
down around a table,  we give away a share of profit to give it to you because it is 
fairer…”[Single Interview n. 1] 
 
Bargaining over the distribution of the value added is thus transferred from the market domain 
to an institution that pursues collective and shared goals keeping in mind the overall sustainability of 
the chain and of the territory. Looking at the figures in Table 2 it seems that the arrangement has 
performed quite well in assuring fair prices to farmers so far.  
Monitoring activities also is under the responsibility of the association. There are two types of 
concerns with respect to quality assurance: compliance with the technical guidelines and brand 
reputation. The former is perceived as less relevant because farmers know each other personally and 
reputation mechanisms operate within the social network. However a form of participatory guarantee 
has been put in place. Participatory guarantee systems “are locally focused quality assurance systems. 
They certify producers based on active participation of stakeholders and are built on a foundation of 
trust, social networks and knowledge exchange” (Kirchner, 2015). Well studied within the organic 
agriculture world, these systems have been associated with social processes such as: sharing 
information, techniques, and traditional knowledge, collective seed management and conservation 
and socialized prices. All features that may be found to some extent in the Montespertoli initiative.  
Conversely brand reputation is rather a sensitive issue as concerns the behaviour of few retailers 
outside the boundaries of the local community and of the local food chain. Brand reputation is a case 
of asset specificity (see section 2), when producers of Montespertoli contract with an outsider retailer, 
they have to check that the bread is sold safeguarding the distinctiveness of the product and the 
values that underpin it and at a fair price. In the words of a baker: 
 
“I have several customers however not everybody has the [Montespertoli ancient 
grain] bread. I have given it to those that, according to my opinion “deserve” it. “Deserve” is 
a nasty word, I mean to those who at least do not sell it as they sell anything else. It must be 
a different stuff, because it is different, and because we want it to be different” [group 
interview n.1] 
 
This is why Montespertoli bread cannot be found in large retailers in Florence but only in few 
shops that understand the values of the chain. However it can be found in the village franchise of a 
large retail cooperative chain COOP, since it operates at village scale . In this case the possibility to 
directly monitoring the retailer behaviour assures the preservation of the product values and 
reputation. 
All formal or informal rules governing the chain described above are of the grass root type, the 
only formal institution that supports the chain is the Municipality of Montespertoli. Not surprising only 
local formal institutions are perceived as valuable by the chain actors since they are part of the 
network of relationships that constitutes the fabric of the local society. This is explained by one of the 
chain actor which link the Municipality to “the local level” the only one in which the actor are 
interested: 
 
“The Municipality is important. If the Municipality trust it, it is important. For example 
here the Municipality trust it, even if it does not provide much money it has done more… 
sometimes it is better not to give money but to give some help, like the schools of 
Montespertoli buying our bread. [...] if people talk about it in the schools this makes families 
more prone to buy the product: so that is important, then other associations have been 
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involved, there are country festivals... That is important since it means that people…. 
Because people should buy the product, the key is that people buy the product and the 
chain works, but it is at local level that it must happen, hence if the Municipality is not 
involved you can’t do anything” [group interview n.1] 
4.4. Outcomes 
The case study shows an interesting bottom up initiative's implementation to foster community's 
led local development process at village scale.  
The Montespertoli bread chain is an example of grass root collective action, which so far has 
been capable to combine social and ecological aspects. First, the reintroduction in cultivation of 
ancient wheat has been paralleled by the introduction of crop rotation and low input agricultural 
methods for the benefit of the environment and landscape. Another externality is provided by the 
nutritional qualities of the chain products (both bread and pasta), which are more digestible and 
healthier than the counterpart conventional products (Sofi et al., 2010). At the social level the chain 
has managed to capture the value added to the product by the ancient wheat despite the formidable 
asymmetries in information. Indeed consumers have no capacity to control if the bread is actually 
made from ancient wheat flour, there is no official certification scheme in place no third party 
guarantee at all. Still, thanks to the local dimension of a market embedded in a dense social network 
of shared values, trust has replaced formal guarantee and information asymmetries have been 
overcome. In addition, the product itself has helped in reinforcing the same social relationships that 
are at the base of its commercial viability. Village festivals and wheat party have helped to empower 
the sense of identity of the local community. It is a well know mechanism in the traditional food 
literature (see, for example, Bessier, 1998), however in this case it is the local dimension of the market 
which is stressed, the local identity is not for sale to the benefits of tourists or other customers. Thus a 
third externality of the chain is precisely the reinforcement of ties within the local community and 
between the sharing values/economy communities.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The production of bread from wheat's ancient varieties in Montespertoli has given rise to a 
collective action, which managed to coordinate and connect researchers and all actors of the 
production chain from farmers to consumers. Expected private benefit from participation in the chain 
are positive for farmers despite the lower yield of ancient wheat varieties and thanks to the informal 
chain contracts whereby the miller guarantees almost full coverage of production costs to farmers.  
Communication and trust, which are key success factors in many grass root collective action (Ostrom, 
2007; Ayer, 1997) are facilitated by the local (village) dimension of the chain embedded in a dense 
network of social relationships. Also the small number of subject involved sharing common values, 
help the emergence of cooperation. More interestingly the group of chain actors give themselves a set 
of simple and effective rules to set the price level whereby the miller and bakers share the farmers’ 
production risk assuring the continuity and viability of the whole chain. In return, farmers agreed to 
have their field controlled by other members of the group in a sort of participatory guarantee scheme 
and to adopt new farming techniques and practises. The collaboration was then institutionalised with 
the creation of the association “Ancient Grains of Montespertoli” in which also consumers can 
participate. According to Ostrom (2010) the attributes that facilitate self-organisation and sustainable 
management of a resource are: the resource is viewed as highly salient; low discount rate in terms of 
benefits from the resource use; higher level of trust  and reciprocity over time; autonomy to decide at 
least some of their rules. 
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Montespertoli has been since long time associated to high quality bread (salience of the 
resource), chain actors are interested in promoting health diet within their community rather than in 
short term profit (low discount rate in term of benefits), they are embedded in a local community  high 
level of trust and reciprocity) and through their association have set at least some of their rules. 
“Usually in these kind of settings, those organising the system have prior organisational 
experience; they have well-developed social capital and they have local leaders who are able to take 
on that very though job. They also share some common understanding of the resource” (Ostrom, 
2010: p. 80) 
We found all these elements in the Montespertoli chain. 
The chain is facing future challenges common to all agricultural sector, such as increased wheat 
yield variability and price competition from conventional wheat, quality issues and potential 
opportunistic behaviour from external actors. At the same time the size of the group and of the 
market, the non-transferable qualities values and the current institutional arrangement should assure 
the necessary degree of resilience and competitiveness, especially when compared with the dire 
situation of conventional wheat growers. We gauge that the Montespertoli chain is an example of the 
integrated territorial paradigm (Sonnino and Marsden, 2006) whereby the product is improved “with 
added value in the form of information regarding origin and quality in order to regain trust and to re-
embed food production in easily understandable chains” (Vogt and Mergenthaler, 2015, p.83) 
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